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ABSTRACT
We focus on the consequences of a voting process on the retirement age when
agents have di¤erent ages and wages. We have two groups: retired people and
workers. Once the retirement age is determined through a voting process, we
verify if that age will keep the same popular support in future elections. At the
end, we do an exercise of comparative static in order to analyze how the retirement
age is conditioned by the redistributive level of the Social Security System. In this
way, we also study how elected retirement age is a¤ected by the wage distribution.
Keywords: Social security, retirement age, median voter.
21. INTRODUCTION
The literature on political economy of public pension provide us with many studies
about Social Security System and its relation with individual’s retirement age.
Most of them (see, for example, Crawford and Lilien[1981] or Burbidge and
Robb[1980]) have developed life-cycle models with endogenous retirement deci-
sions. The objetive of the same is to study the possible implications of Social
Security System on worker’s incentives to retire. However in all these models
there are no collective decisions but an unique individual being a¤ected by the
Social Security.
On the other hand, there are many other models in the political economic
theory of Social Security in which majority voting equilibrium is applied. In
all these cases, the retirement age is always considered as an exogenously given
parameter and people simply accept it. Here the majority-voting equilibrium is
used to choose the tax level in order to determine the size of the Social Security
program (see, for example, Breyer[1994] or Marquardt and Peters[1997]).
Our aim is to deal with the consequences of a voting process on the imple-
mented retirement age when the agents have di¤erent ages and wages. We analyze
this voting process, how it evolves and how these di¤erent ages and wages a¤ect
the retirement age. This way, we can study the popular support lying behind each
retirement proposal.
Other reasons by which we consider the retirement age to be as variable to
vote is that we believe this parameter to be easier to understand for voters than
tax level. In other words, they will be more precise about their optimal retirement
ages than about their optimal tax levels at the time of voting. In consequence, we
consider retirement age as a compulsory age that will be the variable to be elected
by the individuals through a majority voting system. Therefore we can deduce
not only how the composition of the population may in‡uence on the implemented
retirement age but also how this election may a¤ect in the economy.
This article is based in one (Lacomba and Lagos [1999]) in which we develop a
two-stage political economy model. In the …rst, constitutional stage, the govern-
ment chooses the redistribution level of the Social Security Program according to
welfare criteriums. In the second stage, we analyze the optimal retirement ages
of each individual and the median voter theorem is applied. In that model all
individuals belong to the same generation and are di¤erentiated only in wage.
3In the present setting we introduce hetereogeneity on age. We consider a
continuous distribution of agents on ages and wages. The interesting point is to
analyze how people behave with regard to the retirement age not only according
to their di¤erent wage levels but also to their di¤erent ages. In this model we
have two groups: retired people and workers. Both have to face an unexpected
voting process on retirement age.
Retired people behave as a homogeneous group and will prefer the highest
possible retirement age. With regard to the working population, we show that
the optimal retirement age is increasing with the wage level and the older the
workers are, the closer their optimal retirement ages to the ”status quo” one will
be.
Once the retirement age is determined through a voting process, the next step
is to verify if that age will keep the same popular support in future elections.
At the end, we do an exercise of comparative static in order to analyze how
the retirement age is conditioned by the redistributive level of the Social Security
System. In this way, we study how would change the elected retirement age in
two identical societies except in the wage distribution.
This paper is organized as follows: the model is described in section 2; section
3 derives the majority voting process; section 4 focus on exercises of comparative
static with the level of redistribution and the wage distribution; and section 5
concludes. Some proofs are in the Appendix.
2. THE MODEL
We have a constant population in which in the moment of voting the agents will
be di¤erent in wage and in age. We consider this model as a continuous, uniform
distribution of agents on age, with no uncertainty on the length of their lives, going
from zero to a …xed age, T. In this model we focus on a continuous distribution
of agents on wage that will vary from a minimum to a maximum wage level,
[wm;w M]:
People face an unexpected voting process on retirement age in a period t>0,
so they cannot anticipate it. The elected retirement age is believed by everybody
to remain valid inde…nitely. Also, they just vote once in their lifes.
It is necessary to de…ne a status quo that determines the behaviour of people
in the previous years of the moment of voting. This status is one in which agents
4face that all the variables of the model are exogeneously given. Social Security
Program is a balanced budget ”pay as you go” system (PAYG), de…ned by a
redistribution degree and a tax level h®;¿i; and a status quo retirement age, Rsq.
The utility function of individuals over their life-cycle is similar to Crawford
and Lilien, [1981]. These individuals have a stationary and temporally indepen-
dent utility function, which is separable and strictly increasing in consumption
and leisure. We assume that leisure yields utility to the individual only when this
individual is retired. Therefore the only way utility coming from leisure can be
varied is by changing the retirement age. The pension or retirement bene…ts are




















i is the consumption at period t of agent i. The utility of consumption is
twice di¤erentiable with u0 > 0, u00 < 0.L e tµ
t be the leisure, equal for all agents













= v; in their retirement years. Besides, we assume that the elasticity of
consumption marginal utility ½r = ¡cu00 (c)=u0 (c) is non-increasing and smaller
than one.
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We assume that saving earns no interest and that individuals do not discount
the future, so both discount rates are zero (± = r =0 ) : There is also a perfect
capital market, so individuals may borrow at a zero interest rate. Then the utility
function that an individual i has to maximize over his life-cycle (as Breyer, 1994)
can be reduced to
U(ci;µ) ´ Tu(ci)+( T ¡ R
sq)v (2.4)
5The solution to (2.4) is to consume the same amount in each period, where





sqwi (1 ¡ ¿)+( T ¡ R
sq)pi): (2.5)
The annual pension pi is de…ned as follows
pi =
Rsq
T ¡ Rsq¿ [(1 ¡ ®)$ + ®wi] (2.6)
beingRsq=(T ¡ Rsq) the ratio between working and retirement years1 and [(1 ¡ ®)$ + ®wi]
a linear combination of the mean wage ,$, and the individual i’s wage, wi (® 2
[0;1] with ® =0meaning full redistribution, everybody receives the same pen-
sion; and ® =1 , actuarially fairness, that is, the individual bene…ts are equal to
individual contributions).2
It is easy to check that in this system the budget is annually balanced, namely,
total tax contributions of workers are equal to total bene…ts of retired people.
At the moment of voting on retirement age, R; all agents will have a di¤erent
wealth, ¼i(a;wi),t h a tw i l ld e p e n do nh i sa g e ,a; his wage, wi and the current
Social Security Program. The wealth function is given by the total earned income
less the total consumption up to period t.
In summary, when the voting process on the retirement age is made, there
are agents not only with di¤erent age and wage, but also, consequently to these
di¤erences, with di¤erent wealth. In order to study how the voting process will
be, we can divide population in two di¤erentiated groups. By one side, retired
people, those individuals with age bigger than current retirement age, a>R sq.
By other side, working people, those with age below or equal to retirement age,
a 6 Rsq:
Let R¤ (a;w) be the optimal retirement age of an agent of age a and wage w:
In order to study the optimal retirement age of all agents in each group, we will
analyze separately the problems of the retired people and the working people.
1Since the population is constant and uniform on age, this ratio is equal to the dependency
one, that is, the ratio between working and retired people.
2The case in which ® =1is equivalent to private system, where the consumption is ci =
(R=T)wi:
62.1. The retired people
Retired people are all individuals with age higher than status quo retirement age:
Utility function of a retired i of age a is de…ned as





((T ¡ a)pi + a¼i) (2.8)
where pi is the annual pension that this individual is receiving, and a¼i is the
accumulated wealth of each individual since he was born.3
The pension depends positively on R. This will imply that retired people will
prefer a retirement age as high as possible, since we assume that whatever the
result of voting could be they do not come back to the labour market.
We assume that the retired people will not come back to the labour market
even though the elected retirement age is higher than his own age. Then due
to their utility functions and their budget constraints, the higher the retirement
age be, the higher the pension, the consumption and the utility will be. For this
reason, the retired people will always vote for the highest eligible retirement age.4
2.2. The working people
We focus on the optimal retirement age of a worker;R ¤ (a;w). This individual
has his age below or equal to status quo retirement age: The utility function of a





(T ¡ a)(u(c)+v) R 6 a







T¡a ((T ¡ a)p + a¼) R 6 a
1
T¡a ((R ¡ a)w(1 ¡ ¿)+( T ¡ R)p + a¼) R > a
(2.10)
3The formulas of pension and wealth are very extensive and not necessary for the analysis.
The only important thing is that pension depends positively on retirement age.
4The retired agent will be indi¤erent to the retirement ages in this interval
(Rsq +( T ¡ a);T):
7where R is the new retirement age, ¿ the tax level on wage, a¼ the agent’s wealth
and p the annual pension, which depends on ¿ and ®:
The wealth comes from the di¤erence between total earned income less total
consumption until period t and it is given by
¼ =
·




sq [w(1 ¡ ¿)+¿ ((1 ¡ ®)$ + ®w)]
¸
(2.11)





where W =( 1¡ ®)$ + ®w. Therefore we can derive the utility function having
the retirement age R as an unique variable
U (R;a;w)=
8
> > > > <















T¡a ((R ¡ a)w(1 ¡ ¿)+R¿W + a¼)
¢
+( T ¡ R)v
R > a
(2.13)
Thus we have to distinguish between two di¤erents parts in the utility function
according to R be lower or higher than the age of individual, a.
When retirement age is below the age of the individual, R 6 a, his consump-
tion just proceeds from the pension and his wealth, given that he would have to
retire at that retirement age. However, when retirement age is higher than his
age, R > a; then besides pension and wealth, he has to take into account the wage
he will earn in his remaining working years, R ¡ a.
Besides, when R 6 a; the leisure will remain the same, that is, the remaining
years of his life, T ¡ a, regardless the value of R. However, when R > a,i fR
changes, then the leisure years, (T ¡R); change and so does the utility. Those are
the reasons why U consists of two parts, one for R 6 a and another for R > a:
Proposition 2.1. Let a 6 Rsq: The utility function U (R;a;w) is single peaked
in R.M o r e o v e r ,R¤ (a;w) > a:
5There is no problem although R>R sq since when the worker of age a is retired, all people
with age a<Rwill be working.
8Proof. From the …rst and second derivative of the utility function belonging to
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T¡au00(c)¿2 ((1 ¡ ®)$ + ®w)
2 R 6 a
1
T¡au00 (c)(w(1 ¡ ¿)+¿ ((1 ¡ ®)$ + ®w))
2 R > a
I tc a nb eo b s e r v e dt h a tf r o mR =0to R = a, the function is increasing (since
@U (:)=@R > 0 8R 6 a) with respect to retirement age, and from R = a it is
strictily concave (since @2U (:)=@R2 < 0 for all R). In other words, there will be
a unique peak that will be either the own age of the individual, R¤ (a;w)=a;
or it will be to the right of his age, R¤ (a;w) >a :This manner, we can conclude
that preferences are single-peaked on retirement age. See …gures 1 and 2. Q.E.D.
We now can obtain the optimal retirement age of an individual of age a and
income w. Due to the single-peakness of the preferences, it can be applied the
median voter theorem. The next step is to know who the median voter would be.
For this proposal we analyze the sign of @R¤=@a and @R¤=@w:
2.2.1. Workers with di¤erent ages
We will focus our study on individuals having the same wage level but with
di¤erent optima on retirement age depending on how old they are.
Proposition 2.2. Let a; a0 6 Rsq: If a0 >athen jR¤ (a0;w) ¡ Rsqj < jR¤ (a;w) ¡ Rsqj:
I.e, the older an individual is, the closer his optimal retirement age to the status
quo retirement will be.
Proof. From Proposition 5.1., the optimal retirement age is higher or equal than
the own age, R¤ (a;w) > a: Then, there are two di¤erent possibilities:
-W h e nR¤ (a;w) >a ;we calculate @R¤ (a;w)=@a in order to observe how the
optimal retirement age changes when individuals have same wage but di¤erent
9ages. We maximize the utility function (2.13) and from the F.O.C., the implicit




Rsq ¡ R¤ (a;w)
T ¡ a
(2.14)
If optimal retirement age is bigger (less) than the status quo, R¤ (a;w) >R sq
(R¤ (a;w) <R sq),t h e n@R¤ (a;w)=@a < 0( > 0): Therefore increases in a leads
R¤ (a;w) to be closer to Rsq.
-W h e nR¤ (a;w)=a; it is easy to check that increases in a leads to increases
in the optimum retirement age, R¤ (a;w) (recall Proposition 5.1.). Q.E.D.
In summary, individuals with the same wage will have their optimal retirement
ages monotonicly ordered with respect to age toward status quo retirement age,
Rsq.
It can be deduced that individuals with the same wage cannot have their
optimal retirement ages to both sides of Rsq: In other words, if an individual has
R¤ (a;w) <R sq then any other individual of age a0, with the same wage cannot
have his R¤ (a0;w) >R sq:
The intuition lying behind is that wealth was made in relation to the status
quo situation, so wealth acts like a magnet towards Rsq. Consequently, the older
an individual is, the more weight his wealth has, and so his optimal R¤ (a;w) will
be closer to Rsq:
2.2.2. Workers with di¤erent wages
We now focus on the behaviour of agents with the same age but di¤erent wage
levels. That is, we will try to analyze the optimal retirement age of rich and poor
individuals with identical ages.
Proposition 2.3. Let a 6 Rsq: If R¤ (a;w) >athen @R¤ (a;w)=@w > 0.
Proof. From F.O.C. of maximization problem of utility function (2.13), also










10This equation is positive since the elasticity of marginal utility ½r is less than one.
Q.E.D.
Thus, when R¤ (a;w) >a , the most preferred retirement age for agents of the
same age will be increasing with the wage.
On the other hand, if R¤ (a;w)=a it may happen that @R¤ (a;w)=@w =0 .
There will be individuals who will mantain unchanged their optimal retirement
age in spite of their increasing wages.6 See …gures 3, 4 and 5
The situation of the optimal retirement age coinciding with the own age of
the individual, is easier to happen when this one gets older. In these cases it
may be possible that increases in wage does not lead to increases in the optimal
retirement age for people of the same age. The economic intuition is that the
older the individual is, the more relative weight the leisure has and there will be
ocassions in which, whatever the wage would be, all people of the same age will
prefer to …nish their working life in due course.
3. MAJORITY VOTING PROCESS
We next explain the voting process, the way agents vote and which is the elected
retirement age.
3.1. The retired people’s election
In any voting process, retired people will vote the highest retirement age, inde-
pendently of their income and age.7
6We have seen that the utility function is composed of two di¤erent parts, one of them when
R 6 a and the other when R > a. When the maximum of this second part is to the left of a then
the real optimum of the utility function is R¤ (a;w)=a; since the utility function is continuous
in a and to the left of a the valid part is the …rst one, which is increasing. But we have seen that
when the wage is increased the maximun of this second part goes to the right, and therefore
there will be times in which this maximun surpasses the age a: The same will go from the left
to the right of a; and then will become the new optimal retirement age. Hence, there will be
increases in the wage that will lead to this situation and, therefore the optimal retirement age
will be higher and others where the movement to the right of this maximum of the second part
will not be large enough and the optimal retirement age will keep being the same R¤ (a;w)=a:
7It may exist situations in which some retired people will be indi¤erent to both proposed
retirement ages, since we assume they behave as a homogeneous group. This manner, if some
retired people prefer the highest one, all of them will vote it.
11We suppose that they always represent less than …fty per cent of the pop-
ulation. Thus, the median voter will belong to the working group that will be
analyzed below.
3.2. The worker’s election
We start analyzing people just incorporated to the labour market, that is, with
age a =0 : These individuals will have optimal retirement ages that are increasing
with the wage level (see (2.15)) and independent of the status quo retirement
age, Rsq: That is, whatever the status quo is, the optimal retirement age of this
people will not modify. Given a continuous distribution of wages, we will have
a continuous distribution of optimal retirement ages from people with age a =0
that will never change, regardless the status quo.
From the optimal retirement ages of the individuals with age a =0we derive
the optimal ones of the rest of population depending on the age, the wage and
the previous retirement age, Rsq: See …gure 6
From Proposition 5.2., it follows that the older an agent is, the closer to Rsq his
optimal retirement age is. The economic intuition lying behind is that the older
an agent is, the bigger the costs of an alteration on retirement age will be. Since
this agent has planned his life regarding the tax and wage level unchanged, the
wealth and consumption per year and, of course, the established retirement age,
Rsq. Consequently, it seems logical that the oldest workers have their preferences
close to the status quo retirement age Rsq.
3.3. The voting process
Once we know how the whole population would choose the retirement age, the
following step would be to analyze what would happen if government o¤ers the
oportunity to choose a new compulsory retirement age in a democratic process
(through pairwise majority voting system).8
This democratic process will lead us to a retirement age that will be a Con-
dorcet winner, which exists by the median voter Theorem. Let Re be the retire-
ment age elected through this majority voting process which it is considered by
everybody as inde…nitely valid.
8In this process, Rsq does not need to be one of the two alternatives.
12From now on we will call peaks to the optimal retirement age of each individual.
For instance, Rsq leaving more than …fty per cent of peaks below means that more
than …fty per cent of population have their optimal retirement ages lower than
Rsq.
The status quo age, Rsq; has a great importance in the democratic process,
since it will determine the elected retirement age, Re: If we consider that Rsq leaves
more (less) than …fty per cent of peaks below it, that would mean that the majority
would prefer a retirement age less (bigger) than the previously established one.
Then, in a democratic process, the socially elected retirement age, Re,w o u l dm o v e
down (up) from Rsq and, obviously, would leave the …fty per cent of peaks to both
sides. See …gure 7
3.4. The stability of the implemented retirement age
Once a new compulsory retirement age, Re, is elected we may ask if Re will keep
the same popular support T years later.
We suppose that T years later there is another voting process. We will try to
…nd out if Re remains the …fty per cent of peaks below it (including peaks equal to
Re) in the new voting process. According to this, we analyse how the behaviour
of this population changes in relation to the previous one by changing the status
quo from Rsq to Re:
From now on we distinguish between di¤erent periods. Let t be the period
when the voting takes place and t+1the period when the following voting process
takes place T years later.
The elected retirement age in period t will become status quo retirement age










When the elected retirement age on the voting process coincides with the
status quo one, R
sq
t ; then this age Re
t will keep stable: It means that R
sq
t leaves
already the …fty per cent of the peaks in each side. In the following voting process,





t , and therefore nothing changes.
There will be the same percentage of retired people and the composition of the
worker’s preferences will be the same, so the results will be repeated and so on.
That is, it will be a stable retirement age.







t: In other words, in
period t; Re




t+1 leaves more or equal than …fty per cent of peaks below it.
Proof. We want to show that when the status quo retirement age decreases from









We know that R¤
t (0;w)=R¤
t+1 (0;w) for any w 2 [wm;w M], so any agent with
a =0and R¤
t (0;w) 6 Re
t will keep R¤
t+1 (0;w) 6 Re
t = R
sq
t+1: From (2.14) if an
agent of age a =0has R¤
t+1 (0;w) 6 R
sq
t+1 then all workers with the same wage
will have R¤
t+1 (a;w) 6 R
sq
t+1: Therefore individuals with a>0 and R¤
t (a;w) 6 Re
t
as well will keep R¤




So, from period t to period t +1the number of the peaks below or equal to
Re
t may increase. Therefore Re
t+1 may not be equal to R
sq
t+1 but never higher.
In the Appendix we show some examples where the percentage of peaks below
or equal to Re
t increases in the next voting process, in order to illustrate how the
popular support on elected retirement age changes from one voting to the next
one, when the elected retirement age becomes the status quo one.
Proposition 3.3. Let Re
t >R
sq
t : In this case R
sq
t+1 may admit any possibility, i.e.,
R
sq
t+1 may leave more, less or equal than …fty per cent of peaks below it.
Proof. When the status quo retirement age increases from a voting process to





t ; it generates two di¤erent e¤ects on the
distribution of peaks. See …gures 10 and 11
On one hand, the percentage of retired people will be lower in period t+1than









t+1] who, in period t, are retired and in the following period,
t +1 , the people with the same age will be workers.





t (a;w) >R e
t: This group
always prefers a retirement age as high as possible. Let we a wage level such that
R¤
t (0;w e)=Re




t+1] are working and,
also from (2.14), agents with this age and w 2 [wm;w e] have R¤




t: Thus the percentage of peaks below Rt
e = Rt+1
sq is increased (positive e¤ects):9
9If everybody has R¤
t (a;w) >R
sq




14On the other hand, there is another change in the distribution of peaks. In
period t, individuals with a =0and we have R¤
t (0;w e)=Re
t, then from (2.14)
agents with a>0 and we will have R¤
t (a;we) <R e
t: Besides, there are individuals
with a0 2 (0;R
sq
t ) and w 2 (we;w M] who have R¤
t (a0;w)=Re
t; then from (2.14)
individuals with a>a 0 and w 2 (we;w M] have R¤
t (a;w) <R e
t; but in period
t+1identical individuals will have R¤
t+1 (a;w) > R
sq
t+1 = Re




t+1 is decreased (negative e¤ects):
Since there exist positive and negative e¤ects (see …gure 12) and it can not be
showed that one is always higher than the other, then Re
t+1 may be higher, lower
or equal than R
sq
t+1: Q.E.D.
Although it is not possible to know if Re
t+1 will be higher or lower than R
sq
t+1,
one can easily show that, when Re
t >R
sq
t ; the elected retirement age in period
t +1 ;R e
t+1; will be higher than R
sq
t :
3.5. The convergence process
In the previous section, we have showed that the elected retirement age Re
t; could
not keep the same popular support, T years later, when this age becomes status
quo retirement age, R
sq
t+1: In other words, Re
t+1 could not be equal to R
sq
t+1:
The next step in our analysis is to show if it can be obtained, through consecu-
tive voting processes each T years, a stable retirement age. Let Rs be a retirement
age remaining inde…nitely once it becomes in the status quo.
Proposition 3.4. There always exists a sequence of R
sq
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t = Rs may happens in a …nite number of periods.
15w
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t+1; what implies that ¹
sq
t+1 > 50%: Therefore always that
¹
sq




t+1 > ::: > ¹
sq
t+n =5 0 % ; i.e., a bounded and
decreasing monotonic sequence of ¹
sq
t+n which converges, what implies that
R
sq
t converges to Rs.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c eR
sq
t converges to Rs; it can be found
ap e r i o dt0 such that jR
sq
t0 ¡ Re
t0j <±for any ±, which by continuity implies
that j¹
sq





t : In this case ¹
sq









t+1: From Proposition 5.6 R
sq
t+1 may be
higher, lower or equal to Re
t+1, which implies that ¹
sq
t+1 may be higher, lower
or equal to 50% respectively. If ¹
sq
t+1 > 50% w ew o u l db ei nt h ec a s e s1 and
2: If ¹
sq
t+1 < 50% you can apply the same reasoning, then you have proved
that this sequence converges to the 50%: Q.E.D.
Consequently, regardless to the initial status quo retirement age, Rs will be
reached.
4. RELATION BETWEEN RETIREMENT AGE, REDIS-
TRIBUTION DEGREE AND WAGE DISTRIBUTION
An interesting exercise of comparative static is to analyze, in the short-run and
in the long-run, how the retirement age is a¤ected by di¤erent degrees of redistri-
bution or how is related to the wage distribution.
According to this, we will focus on the elected retirement age in the …rst voting
process, Re
t, and on the stable retirement age, Rs:
4.1. Di¤erent degree of redistribution.
One of the most interesting aspects of the Social Security Programs is how redis-
tributive they are. In our particular case, we are interested in studying how this
redistribution degree a¤ects the voting decision on retirement age.
We analyze two Social Security Programs with di¤erent degrees of redistribu-
tion, ®; but with the same tax level, ¿; and status quo retirement age, Rsq.W e
study in the two following propositions how the degree of redistribution will a¤ect
Rs and Re
t through a democratic process.
16Let Rs
® be the stable retirement age with a determined redistribution level,
®.11 Let R¤(0;$) be optimal retirement age of individual of age a =0and mean
wage $:
Proposition 4.1. If ^ ®<®then jRs
^ ® ¡ R¤(0;$)j < jRs
® ¡ R¤(0;$)j.W h e n a
Social Security Program is more redistributive (lower ®),s t a b l er e t i r e m e n ta g e
will be closer to optimal retirement age of individual of age a =0a n dm e a nw a g e
$.
Proof. We need to …nd out the sign of @R¤ (a;w)=@®: From F.O.C. of maximiza-











If w<$(w>$ ); that is, if the individual has a lower (higher) wage level than
the mean one, then a more redistributive system, ( lower ®), leads to an strictly
increase (decrease) in his optimal retirement age. See …gure 13
Let R¤
®(a;w) be the optimal retirement age related to redistribution degree
®: Let ws
® be the wage such that for all age R¤(a;ws
®)=Rs
®.L e t ^ ®<® :The
percentage of peaks below Rs
^ ® is composed by people with age a 2 [0;R s
^ ®] and
wage w 2 [wm;w s
^ ®]: See …gure 14.1
If ws
^ ® <$ , from (2.15) and (4.1) R¤
^ ®(0;w s
^ ®)=R¤
®(0; ~ w) only if ~ w>w s




^ ® leaves …fty per cent of peaks below it (see …gure 14.1), then
if R¤
®(0; ~ w) were equal to Rsq
® ; it would leave more than …fty per cent since the
percentage of peaks below it, it would be composed by people with age a 2 [0;R s
^ ®]









^ ® >$then Rs
® >R s
^ ® (see …gure 14.2): Q.E.D.
From this proposition we derive how the stable retirement age is a¤ected by the
redistribution level of the Social Security Program, and how this e¤ect is di¤erent
depending of the relation between the mean wage and the median voter’s wage.
Let ws
® b et h ew a g es u c ht h a tf o ra l la g eR¤(a;ws
®)=Rs
®; i.e., the wage that
leaves …fty per cent of population below it. If this wage is lower than mean wage,
ws
® <$ ;then a Social Security Program with a higher redistribution degree will
yield a higher retirement age, and therefore a bigger total production. Equally,
when ws >$ ;a higher redistribution degree will yield a lower retirement age.
11It’s easy to check that Rs is unique.
17This section allows us to see the importance of retired people and their weight
in the voting process. If this people did not vote, then the median voter’s wage
would be the median wage. Therefore, always that median wage were lower than
mean wage, which is the realistic case, a S.S. Program with higher redistribution
degree would lead to a higher stable retirement age. But when we include retired
people in the voting process, this last result does not always hold. Now the
important thing is not the relation between median and mean wage, but the
relation between mean wage and median voter’s wage, which including retired
people is not the median wage any longer. So we can have a case in which median
wage would be lower than mean wage, but median voter’s wage would be higher
than mean one, and then a higher redistribution would be related with a lower
retirement age. Therefore, due to retired people, not always median wage be lower
than mean wage, a more redistributive Social Security Program will be related to
a higher retirement age.
With respect to the analysis of the e¤ects induced by the redistribution degree
of the S. S. Program on the elected retirement age in the …rst voting process,we
need to impose stronger conditions to get similar results.
Proposition 4.2. Let ^ ®<® :If Re
t;^ ® < (>)R¤




Proof. We are going to prove that if Re
t;^ ® leaves the …fty per cent of the peaks
below, then the same retirement age under ® will leave more than 50% of peaks
below.
Let we be the wage such that R¤
t;^ ®(a0;w e)=Re







t;^ ® leaves the …fty per cent of the peaks below it, under a Social
Security Program with an ^ ® redistribution degree.






t;®(a0;w e) <R ¤
t;^ ®(a0;we):
Then, under an ® redistribution degree, Re
t;^ ® will leave more than 50% of the
peaks below it, so Re
t;® must be lower than Re
t;^ ®: See …gure 15
Analogously, if Re
t;^ ® >R ¤(a;$) then Re
t;^ ® <R e
t;®.Q . E . D .
Therefore, to obtain that a higher redistribution degree will lead to a higher
retirement age, this one not only has to be lower than R¤
t(0;$), but also lower than
R¤
t(a;$) for any age. So, the …nal outcome will depend on how the population is
distributed.
184.2. Di¤erent wage distributions.
With respect to the e¤ects of the wage distribution on the elected retirement age
in the …rst voting process, the results are ambiguous. Therefore, here we focus on
the stable retirement age. We compare two identical societies but with di¤erent
wage distribution.12 We analyze a realistic situation by considering that in both
cases the median wage is lower than the mean wage.
In our model we assume that the retired people behave with regard to the
optimal retirement age as if they were those who earn the highest wage level.
We consider two di¤erent settings, one in which we include the retired people
and another in which we do not include them.
In the …rst case, without retired people, the median voter is the voter with the
median wage level. Then the society with the highest median wage level (always
lower than the mean wage) will have a median voter with a higher wage level.
Consequently, from (2.15) this society will have a higher retirement age.
However, in the second case, when we include the retired people, the median
voter is no longer the agent with the median wage level. Here the median voter
will have a wage level either lower or larger than the mean wage (depending on
the percentage of the retired people), but always higher than the median wage.
If we suppose that in both societies the median voter’s wage is larger than the
mean wage, then the most egalitarian one will have the median voter’s wage lower
than the other one. Therefore, from (2.15) the most egalitarian one will have a
lower retirement age. See …gure 16
By this reason, it is clear the great importance of retired people since the
median voter would become a voter with a higher wage level (including retireds).
Therefore, more egalitarian societies can have lower retirement ages.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this article our objective is to observe the behaviour of agents with di¤erent
ages and wages with regard to their optimal retirement ages. It is showed that
the optimal retirement age is increasing with the wage level. Besides, the results
show that the elder the workers are, the closer their optimal retirement ages to
12Same mean wage but di¤erent median wage.
19status quo one will be. The intuition lying behind is that the increasing weight
of wealth and leisure when they are getting old.
We prove that the elected retirement age could not keep the same popular
support is future elections. However, it is possible to …nd a retirement age which
leaves inde…nitely the …fty per cent of the population to both sides.
On the other hand, in an exercise of comparative static, we compare two
identical Social Security Programs with di¤erent degree of redistribution and two
identical societies with di¤erent wage distribution. In both cases, we obtain similar
conclusions. The most redistributive or the most egalitarian one may have lower
retirement ages. This result is apparently contradicting the philosophy of the
increasing relation between optimal retirement ages and wage levels. This might
be explained by the weight of the retired people.
A natural extension of this article is to introduce the aging problem. Roughly
speaking, there seems that with aging, the percentage of retired people will in-
crease and, therefore, the retirement age will go up. Since the larger the percentage
of retired people is, the higher the retirement age will be.
An intuition that can be analyzed from this setting is that this problem may
be thought as a decision about the total worked hours. As a matter of fact, if the
retirement age is modi…ed, we are changing the total amount of worked hours.
This issue is one of the most important problems in industrialized countries as
consequence of unemployed people.
6. APPENDIX









t+1; in order to illustrate how changes in the status quo can a¤ect the popular
support on the elected one.
There will be cases in which there exists (see …gures 8.1 and 9.1) a wage




t . From (2.14) we know that since
R¤
t (0;w e) <R
sq
t then R¤
t (a>0;w e) >R e








t. Consequently, in period t with wage
w = we just people with age a =0has R¤
t 6 Re
t; but in period t +1all people







t implies (from (2.14)) that people with age a0 2 (0;R e
t) have
R¤
t (a0;we) >R e
t: From (2.15) we know that there will be individuals with wage
w<w e such that R¤
t (a0;w) <R ¤
t (a0;w e) but higher than Re
t.F o r e x a m p l e ,f o r
agents with age a = Re
t; it can be found a wage ^ w 2 [wm;w e) such that for any








Another example. When we satis…ying R¤
t (0;w e)=Re
t does not exist. In this
case, there exists an age ^ a (see …gures 8.2 and 9.2) from which on individuals
with a 2 (^ a;Re
t] and the highest wage level, wM will have R¤
t (a;wM) >R e
t but
R¤




Moreover, individuals with a = Re
t and wM have R¤
t (Re
t;w M) >R e
t and there-





t;w M). Thus it can be found a wage ^ w 2 [wm;w M) such that for any








Consequently, there exists a group of individuals with a 2 (^ a;Re
t] and di¤erent
wages such that R¤
t (a;w) >R e
t but R¤




percentage of peaks below Re
t will be higher in the next voting.
21Figure 1



















































R  leaves more than 50% peaks below it
sqFigure 8.1



















Peaks that in period t are 
above of Rtand in period t+1 
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above of Rtand in period t+1 








































































































Peaks that in period t are 
above of Rtand in period t+1 
are below of Rt
e
e
Peaks that in period t are 
below of Rtand in period t+1 




























Two different Social Security Programs applied to the same society
Social Security Program of type 1 has 
a higher redistribution degree than S.S. 
















sq Ri Optimal retirement age related
to a Social Security Program
with a redistribution degree type i,
where i=1,2Figure 14.1


















The stable retirement age 
with S.S.Program 2 will be 
lower than with S.S.Program 1
s R1*(0,w1)=R1
sFigure 14.2
Relating different redistribution degrees and stable retirement age
The stable retirement age 
with S.S.Program 2 will be 




















Relating different redistribution degrees and elected retirement age
The elected retirement age 
with S.S.Program 2 will be 
























a b c d
w - Wages
   .- Same mean wage
a, b .- Median wages
c, d.- Median voter's wages
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